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distinctively commercial class by increasing the supply of cheap clerks, or else, genuinely concerned with literary culture, it is severed too completely from the working-day to which it is designed as a relief element. Miss Addams pleads powerfully for a more integrated treatment of education which shall help to counteract the narrowing tendencies of specialized machine processes, by enabling the worker in one of these processes to feel and understand the part he is playing, as a unit in the wider economy of the Society for which he works. "Feeding a machine with a material of which he has no knowledge, producing a product, totally unrelated to the rest of his life, without in the least knowing what becomes of it, or its connection with the community, is, of course, unquestionably deadening to his intellectual and moral life. To make the moral connection it would be necessary to give him a social consciousness of the value of his work, and at least a sense of participation and a certain interest in its ultimate use; to make the intellectual connection, it would be essential to create in him some historic conception of the development of industry, and the relation of his individual work to it" (p. 214). Here and everywhere throughout the volume, we find stimulating hints of the application of the spirit of democracy to the hard, concrete problems of our age.

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PHILOSOPHY: ITS SCOPE AND RELATIONS. By Henry Sidgwick.
London and New York: Macmillan. 1902. Pp. xvii, 252.

I do not myself find it by any means an easy task, and I think it probable that my perplexity will be shared by other students—to say precisely what is the general impression left upon my mind after perusing Prof. Sidgwick's posthumous volume of lectures introductory to the study of Philosophy. Some of the fine qualities one had learned to expect from the author of "Methods of Ethics" are certainly as prominent in these Lectures as in the works which appeared in his life-time and had the advantage of his final revision. There is the same tone of detachment from the various conflicting parties to one or other of which most of us who take an interest in Philosophy are only too ready to commit ourselves, the same candid and nobly impartial endeavor to let the views which the author himself finally rejects receive full and fair exposition, the same note of unmistakable distinction in the style.

The pages of the present volume, like those of its predecessors, are moreover from time to time enlivened by the sallies of a grave and gentle humor, none the less enjoyable because it is held in severe restraint on most occasions, and is absolutely free from malice when it is allowed to appear. Such epigrams as this, directed against the sociological Phenomenalist, "the word *true* has no magic to neutralize the scepticism latent in the word *relative*," or this, with reference to the Comtian "law of the three stages." "I am even disposed to admit a large element in his doctrine of three stages so far as it is positive; only instead of 'theology' and 'metaphysics' I should venture to substitute 'crude theology' and 'bad metaphysics',"—may rank with the best specimens of their author's lighter style.

And yet, on the other hand, these lectures also seem to me to exhibit what I at any rate have always felt as the cardinal defect of the "Method of Ethics," a want of real grasp of fundamental philosophical problems. Prof. Sidgwick's discussions of various views as to the sphere of Philosophy and its relations to the special sciences are always interesting and usually instructive; yet when one has laid the book down, one hardly feels that one has learned anything fresh either as to the nature of philosophical problems or as to the difference in aim and method between Philosophy and the sciences. Altogether the discussion seems to me to leave the beginner in the subject pretty much where it found him, in the antechamber of Philosophy. Partly, no doubt, this want of definite result is capable of an historical explanation. The adequate discussion of the scope of Metaphysical Philosophy and the nature of the distinction between it and other branches of study presupposes in the first place a definite metaphysical doctrine, and in the second a satisfactory theory of the methodology of knowledge. Prof. Sidgwick, whose genius may fairly be said to be shown in all that he has written to be far more critical than constructive, had himself not a positive metaphysic or theory of knowledge of his own, nor did the systems which he was in the main interested in criticising adequately supply the want. Neither in Mill, nor in Green, nor in Herbert Spencer could he have found a systematic and fully worked out view as to the proper scope and merits of philosophical construction on the one side, and the various groups of sciences on the other; while Comte, with whom the author is largely occupied in the later lectures, has only the theory of knowledge without the

metaphysics. As an illustration of the comparative superficiality with which the want of a thoroughly worked-out philosophical point of view leads Prof. Sidgwick to treat some highly important issues, I may take the account of History which he adopts in the two lectures on the relation of Philosophy to History (Lectures 6 and 7). History, according to this view, is simply a complete and accurate record of the events of the past. Thus "Natural History" and historical astronomy or physics are placed on exactly the same footing, with respect to their scope and method, as the history of human societies. And the only difference of spirit recognized between these latter sciences and abstract mechanics is that the former deal with what has actually happened. Yet it should be obvious, except to those, if there are any such still left, who regard History in the light of an "old almanac," that human History, at any rate, aims at being a great deal more than a "record of past facts;" its object is not the mere recording of the facts in their chronological order, nor yet their relation to laws of sequence, but their teleological interpretation as the progressive embodiment of national character. From this it follows at once that the relation of Philosophy to History, in the true sense of the word, cannot be adequately determined until we have recognized the differences of aim and method which separates the true historical sciences from the purely physical, and again that Prof. Sidgwick's identification of social History with sociology is at least open to the very gravest doubt. The study which aims merely at the establishment of what are ultimately statistical uniformities in the conduct of social groups, and that which seeks to interpret the life of an individual group as the expression of an individual character may well diverge widely in concepts and methods; and without some recognition of their divergent aims and methods, the question of their respective relations to general Philosophy can scarcely be profitably discussed.

Similarly with respect to the Physical Sciences. Prof. Sidgwick gives as one main reason for rejecting the view that Metaphysics deals with reality but Physics with appearance, the argument that in Physics too a distinction is drawn between the real and the merely apparent (Lecture 4.) But the value of this argument depends entirely on our view as to whether there are or are not different "orders" or "degrees" of reality; if there are, it will not follow that every science which, for its own purposes, distinguishes what is real from what is apparent must be claiming to deal with an

ultimate reality. Whether Physics in particular makes this latter claim, and if so whether the claim is justified, are questions which cannot be answered except on the strength of a searching examination of the logical nature of the fundamental postulates of the mechanical view of natural process with which the successful prosecution of Physics appears to be bound up.

A still more difficult problem is suggested by the existence of such a science as Biology. How far, in evolutionist Biology, is the standpoint of the description of events in terms of the mechanical hypothesis of Physics abandoned for the teleological interpretation of events in the spirit of History? And what are the metaphysical implications of the application of teleological concepts like that of development to processes of the non-human world? These and similar problems are the questions which appear to me to call for solution in any adequate attempt to determine the scope of Philosophy and its relations to the various sciences, and it is because I neither find any solution of them in the present volume, nor discover in it any guiding principle which would help me to solve them for myself, that I am forced to confess to a certain disappointment with it.

To turn to the individual lectures; in the first two, the positions established as to the general scope of Philosophy are in the main two, (1) that Philosophy, as distinguished from the special sciences, aims at the understanding of the world as a *whole*, and (2) that the supreme task of such a study is the co-ordination of "Theoretical" with "Practical" Philosophy, the inclusion in a single coherent system of our knowledge of what "is" and our moral and æsthetic judgments as to what "ought to be." In connection with the first position a good point is made, against the Spencerian conception of Philosophy as completely *unified* knowledge, by the argument that the differences between the various aspects or departments of existence studied by different branches of knowledge, are just as significant for our final view of the systematic whole to which they belong as the agreements. Less satisfactory is the reason given for rejecting the view that the *differentia* of Philosophy lies in its being concerned with reality as opposed to appearance, viz: that Philosophy cannot afford to disregard "phenomena," while the sciences, in their turn, claim to deal with realities. On the second half of this argument, as repeated in Lecture 4, with special reference to Physics, I have already commented. The first half seems further open to the objection

that it tacitly assumes the position of a dualism which the principal defenders of the definition would certainly repudiate. From their point of view, "phenomena" or "appearances" are only "un-real" when you deal with them in abstraction from the concrete whole which manifests its nature through them. Thus Philosophy *must* deal with "phenomena" precisely *because* its object is to know "onta," and again, if the other sciences deal with "mere appearance," that is not because they are concerned with "phenomena," but because they view "phenomena" from a standpoint which disregards their character *as* phenomenal of the "on" or "onta" of which they are the systematic expression. Prof. Sidgwick's criterion seems, in fact, unduly influenced by the tacit identification of "reality," as contrasted with appearance, with the Kantian "Thing-in-itself."

As to the second contention, we might perhaps find a difficulty about the precise form in which the problem is stated. Prof. Sidgwick, in his second lecture, argues convincingly against the reduction of the whole content of knowledge to "positive" science in the sense of a mere record of facts. But, so long as he is allowed to except the "normative sciences" and the allied "arts" from the scope of positive science, he seems quite content that the historical sciences should be included under it. I should like to ask whether the real opposition is not between sciences which employ teleological categories, and those which are content with merely mechanical conceptions, *i. e.*, between historical interpretation and mechanical description? To my own mind, the distinction between History and Statistics, for instance, appears much more fundamental than that between History and Ethics. And, as already suggested, I find a further difficulty in the position of the biological and psychological sciences, which seem, *prima facie* at least, to have both a teleological and a mechanical aspect. In a word, the rough distinction between positive and normative sciences appears to require expansion into a detailed theory of the possible points of view which facts can be studied and the consequent differences of method and initial postulates.

With the third lecture we approach the difficult problem of the distinction between Psychology and Philosophy. For most readers the main interest of the chapter will probably be in the argument by which Prof. Sidgwick seeks to defend the dualistic view of the ultimate dispartateness of mind and matter against "Men-

talism." By Mentalism, it must be explained, the author understands any doctrine which regards material things as ultimately composed of mental elements. Thus the term embraces not only the sensationalism of Hume and Mill, but also the relationism of Green, the only representative of the Neo-Kantian views of whom Prof. Sidgwick takes particular account. It is only Mentalism of the former type, the doctrine that the material thing is a complex of sense-presentation, which in his view can be met and refuted by denying the claim of psychological analysis to decide the metaphysical issue of the independent existence of matter. The Neo-Kantian "Idealist" takes his stand elsewhere than on the results of psychological analysis and has to be met along other lines.

Against sensationalism then Prof. Sidgwick's case is this: (a) Reflective analysis enables us to distinguish, in the case of the primary qualities of body (*i. e.*, according to his interpretation, the qualities discerned by touch and "the muscular sense,") between (1) "a sensational complex . . . composed of elements belonging to muscular sense as well as to the sense of touch," and (2) "a cognition . . . of relational qualities of matter as it exists independently of any perception" (p. 68). Take for instance the quality hardness. I can distinguish between the tendency of a body to preserve its form and internal structure unchanged when it comes into collision with another body, (the "relational quality" of hardness) and the complex sensation of touch, pressure, and "muscular sense," which I receive when a body possessing this tendency is in contact with one of my bodily organs. But if I can thus distinguish (1) and (2), reflective analysis cannot warrant the inference that the material world *is* nothing but the presentation-complexes through which I cognize it. And (3) if *Psychogonical Analysis* is invoked to prove that all our cognitions have been originally developed out of associations between sensations, (one sees here, by the way, that Prof. Sidgwick's psychological opponents belong to a now antiquated school) then, over and above the doubts which might be raised as to the truth of this proposition, its relevancy may be denied. For at best it only shows that the sensations in question are the antecedents, not that they are the constituent elements of our conception of the material world. Moreover, the ordinary sensationalist usually contradicts himself by presupposing the existence of a brain and nervous system as a condition of the supposed development.

Now, if we set aside the last contention, which does appear to

hit a blot in all the sensationalist theories, it may be doubted whether Prof. Sidgwick's argument, as it stands, would really be found unanswerable by the sensationalist, and it is, I think, clear that it is at least more damaging to sensationalism than corroborative of "Natural Dualism." Take first his fundamental point, the distinction between certain qualities of matter and the sensations through which we cognize them. A sensationalist who knows his business will surely fasten upon the presence of the word "tendencies" in Prof. Sidgwick's account of these primary qualities. "You say," he might urge "that the hard body A not only does preserve its structure when in collision with B, but that it permanently has the *tendency* to do so. What sort of actual fact do you mean by this tendency? Can you give it any definite meaning, except what is derived from the content of tactual and visual sensation of some kind? *E. g.*, A is hard, tends to preserve its structure, even when it is not in collision with anything. Of this I may satisfy myself by visual perception. Then, if this tendency is not to be resolved into the existence of the visual perception in question, in which case we are once more thrown back upon sensationalism, you surely must distinguish for the visual percept, as you did for the tactual, between the presentation and the fact cognized through it. Thus your argument against sensationalism is at least inconsistent with your previous admission (p. 64) that *secondary* qualities are mere sensation-complexes." Now if the argument were thus revised, by making the distinction between the sensation and the quality it cognizes universal, though it clearly would be fatal to sensationalism, I do not see how it supports the particular conclusion of the Natural Dualist. From another side, again, we might urge that a theory which identifies the "independent" qualities of bodies with their relations to one another is bound to take some note of the famous difficulties connected with the relational scheme, a topic upon which Prof. Sidgwick is entirely silent.

Prof. Sidgwick's rejoinder to the Neo-Kantian Mentalist is only imperfectly represented in the appendix to the fourth lecture, from which it appears that his fundamental objection to their view was that it implies the relegation of time and space to the rank of mere appearance. Prof. Sidgwick is perhaps mistaken in urging that this denial of the ultimate reality of time and space, even if thinkable, is useless, because it does not assist us in solving problems relating to the phenomenal world. I should have thought

e. g. that the question of the reality of time had an obvious bearing upon the problem created by the apparent existence of evil, a problem which Prof. Sidgwick in his concluding lectures appears to consider entirely insoluble.

In the fourth and fifth lectures Prof. Sidgwick attempts to discriminate between Metaphysics and Philosophy in general. The result at which he ultimately arrives, after a somewhat desultory discussion, is that Philosophy is Metaphysics, so far as the synthesis of truths which it affects goes beyond the limits of what can be directly verified by particular experiences, nor Metaphysics so far as it rests content with constructions which might conceivably be verified by special experiences. Further, Metaphysics differs from logic in that logic gives the criterion of mediate Metaphysics of immediate general truths. It is not, I think, quite clear how far the latter of these positions is really compatible with the former. It is not merely that, as the author admits, logical and metaphysical investigations cannot be ultimately separated, but that the whole content of pure logic would seem to be included in Metaphysics, according to the definition previously given of Metaphysical Philosophy. Nor, again, is it quite clear how far the author could seriously have defended the notion that there are "axioms of knowledge which are immediately self-evident in the proper sense, *i. e.*, not merely presupposed by, and revealed by analysis in the structure of knowledge as a whole, but actually capable of being immediately discerned as true by simple inspection of their contents."

It is possible that the apparently "intuitive" character which is ascribed in the "Method of Ethics" to certain simple ethical propositions led Prof. Sidgwick to minimize the difficulties inherent in such a recognition of "unproved premises of proof."

I have dwelt at such length on some of the general features of Prof. Sidgwick's volume that I must abstain from going into details with regard to the six lectures (6-11) which deal with the relation of Philosophy to History and Sociology. I have already indicated what seems to me the serious deficiency of this part of the book. Prof. Sidgwick, as I have said, fails to appreciate the fundamental distinction between Natural and Historical Science in respect of aims and methods, and in consequence, does not seem to me to throw much light upon the relation of the truths of History and Sociology to the "ultimate synthesis" of truths which is Philosophy. What he really does in this series of lectures is to dis-

cuss in an interesting way the bearing of recent developments of historical and sociological study upon the spirit in which Philosophy should be pursued. Thus the main result of lectures 6 and 7 is the, as I think, valid demonstration that the theory of biological evolution does not afford any cogent arguments for Materialism. Lectures 8 and 9 discuss the question whether sociological inquiry into the origin of beliefs is logically bound to lead to scepticism as to the validity, and lectures 10 and 11 the question whether the study of history of itself will yield a satisfactory criterion of social progress. Both questions are answered in the negative. As to the latter, at any rate, it might perhaps be urged that if by history we mean the teleological interpretation, as distinct from the mere record, of the past, the "Progressionist" might have more of a case than Prof. Sidgwick allows. If we can detect in the past not a mere succession of changes but a continuous approximation to a coherent ideal, may we not validly use that ideal as a standard by which to estimate further progress in the future? The full working out of this thought would lead to a reconsideration of the question propounded by the twelfth lecture, whether the divergence of "theoretical" and "practical" Philosophy is irreducible. Prof. Sidgwick's own opinion here, as in the works published in his lifetime, appears to be that it is at best only partly reducible and that only by means of Theistic assumptions which cannot be demonstrated.

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PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE AND OTHER ESSAYS. By J. H. Muirhead, M. A., Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in the University of Birmingham. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd. 1902.

Professor Muirhead has given us, in this volume of essays, thirteen papers, nine of which are classed as "ethical," and four as "logical." Some of the "ethical" ones would certainly not be regarded as philosophical essays by the pedantry or affectation of philosophical dry-as-dusts, who think nothing can be "philosophical" which has any life or vital interest about it. At the same time, the four closing papers on "logical" themes—which were read before the Aristotelian Society of London—are far the ablest and most valuable in the book.